INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary culture theory (ECT) is a growing corpus of principles and arguments that attempt to explain the "descent with modification" of human cultural systems. Although it encompasses diverse viewpoints (see compari sons in 24:158-66; 52; 53:Ch. 4), ECT is united by three underlying proposi tions: (a) that the socially transmitted information systems we call "cultures" provide human populations with an important second source of heritable vari ation; (b) that these cultural systems are historically interrelated by a branch ing, hierarchical pattern of descent; and (c) that this "cultural phylogeny" is itself a product of two basic kinds of processes-transformation (that is, se quential change within any given culture) and diversification (the branching of one culture into two or more descendants). It bears emphasizing that evolu tionary culture theory differs substantially from earlier views of cultural evolu tion (such as those of classical evolutionary anthropology, neoevolutionism, and sociobiology; see 52) and that it refers not to any one position or line of argument today, but rather to the diverse collection of efforts to elucidate the patterns and processes of descent with modification in cultures.
In this chapter, I review recent attempts to use evolutionary culture theory to analyze stasis and change in human cultural systems. Among the many reasons why a review of these attempts is useful today, three seem particularly compelling. First, EeT is still to some degree isolated from mainstream con cerns in anthropology and related social sciences. One reason for this is simply the field's youth: Its first important theory papers were published only in 1973 (32, 33) . Another reason is the notoriety of earlier kinds of cultural inquiry that called themselves "evolutionary"-a notoriety vigorously renewed during the sociobiology debate (e.g. 30, 144) . But perhaps a more important reason is that applications, especially thorough empirical analyses of phenomena of wider interest to social scientists, have to date received less attention than theoretical arguments and mathematical models. I hope a review of existing applications will both demonstrate the value of ECT and encourage new and more exten sive empirical studies.
Second, evolutionary culture theory does not require an impoverished con ceptualization of culture as is often believed. Although early arguments did give that impression (e.g. 35, 50, 51, 106, 171) , the problem was one of oversimplification, not incompatibility. A review of applications can make clear that this shortcoming resulted more from the novelty of this line of inquiry than from an inherent weakness in the evolutionary approach. Finally, I believe that EeT has itself evolved without adequate attention to the social structure of human populations. In most formulations, for example, cultural change is modeled as the statistical outcome of simple decision-making by individuals; as one author noted (151:6) , this reduces cultural evolution to "the product of choices made in the marketplace of cultural possibilities" (for an explicit case in point, see 106: 176) . A review of applications illustrates why this is at best a caricature of cultural evolution, and can suggest steps to correct it.
With these goals in mind, I address empirical work bearing on two main areas of EeT, conveniently summarized by Darwin's aphorism: namely, "de scent" (i.e. cultural uses of the descent relationship) and "modification" (i.e. studies of the processes causing sequential transformation within cultural sys tems). I have taken the liberty of including a number of works that were not undertaken as applications of evolutionary theory by their authors, but that do provide useful empirical examples of cultural descent and modification. Be cause EeT is still a relatively new endeavor, I focus largely on its application to culturally homogeneous societies or "ethnolinguistic populations." This body of theory can make many useful contributions to the study of culture in more complicated, heterogeneous settings, including the modem nation-state; for now, however, the arguments and issues are best illustrated in less complex tree-like (142:257) and are better described by "wave theory" (see 82:32-33) . It will therefore be useful to distinguish between the bona fide phylogenies of cultures related by birth and the phylogeny-like mix of horizontal transfer and descent that may characterize the evolutionary history of any given technol ogy, tradition, or social institution; my focus here is on the former.
Where TRIMs are strong and diversification consistently uniparental, there will be no mixed ancestries in a group of related cultures, and the correspond ing family tree will specify a "unique and unambiguous" phylogeny, much as assumed by cladistic classification in biology (136:51) . Such "unmixed" trees, or unmixed portions of trees, have a special importance in the study of cultural evolution because they provide a kind of "general reference system" for the group of related cultures (after 78), containing useful information about their historical ties. Where TRIMs are less effective and fusion occasional or inter mittent, the resulting "mixed" family tree will still contain useful information and implications about cultural history. However, it will also be more difficult to infer parental relationships and thus to piece together an accurate phylo geny.
In organic evolution, the descent relationship has special importance be cause it creates what Darwin (44:206) called a "unity of type" among descen dants: that "fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in organic beings of the same class, which is quite independent of their habits of life." In cultural evolution, one can speak of an analogous "unity" consisting of the cultural similarities among societies of a given region and period that are, likewise, independent of current circumstances and ecological exigencies. Any particular instance of such similarity can be called a cultural homology (that is, a similarity by descent) to distinguish it from other kinds of similarity among cultural systems (see 52: 191) including: analogy (similarity by convergence or by parallel change), synology (similarity by diffusion or borrowing), "icology" or iconic similarity (similarity by intrinsic association; see example below), and mere coincidence (similarity by chance or accident). The family-tree hy pothesis posits a large and generally unappreciated amount of similarity by descent among human cultural systems. Although some homologies are surely universal in their distribution (see discussion in 52: 188-89), similarities by descent will generally be more specific, more detectable, and more abundant in instances of relatively recent cultural divergence-within language families or subfamilies, for example (see 1, 2). For convenience, I refer to this generaliza tion as the "descent principle."
Putting Cultural Descent to Work
The analytical value and utility of the descent relationship among human cultures have been suggested many times by scholars in all four main subfields of anthropology (see e.g. 92, 102, 141, 143, 159, 169) . Yet descent has rarely been given its due, in part because of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary data, comparative and/or diachronic, but also because of a prejudice widely 140: 134) , the descent relationship has played a prominent role in historical and comparative linguistics (5, 27, 82) , where it has been used in two related ways. First, descent has served as the basis for the so-called "genetic classification" of languages into a structured taxonomy of phyla, stocks, fami lies, subfamilies, and the like (75, 142, 143) . Here the idea is that ties of descent have created a hierarchy of differential similarity among related languages, a hierarchy that can be detected through systematic comparative analysis. One of the more successful, though still controversial, techniques for doing this is Greenberg's method of "multilateral comparison" (71, 72, 142, 143) : the study of basic word lists from an array of languages in an effort to distinguish probable "genetic cognates" from similarities caused by diffusion, sound symbolism (i.e. the iconic similarity between sound and its meaning, as in onomatopoeic words), and chance. A substantial list of suspected cognates is taken as prima facie evidence that two or more languages have probably descended with modifica tion from a common ancestor. This follows from the "relatedness hypothesis" (82: 17) , which holds that descent from common origins is the most likely explanation for systematic similarities of sound and meaning in the basic vocabularies of a group of languages (see also 160) . By themselves, of course, suspected cognates do not "prove" a descent relationship, particularly in situ ations where language contact has occurred (a point emphasized in 164a); still, they are useful for identifying similarities that warrant further study (see 72) .
Once this first step is completed, the search continues within the group of hypothetical descendants for "exclusively shared innovations" (142:14) , whether lexical, phonological, semantic, or syntactic. The presence of such innovations can both confirm suspected descent relationships and reveal more detailed similarities among certain subgroupings, allowing one to reconstruct a model of phylogenetic relationships. Here, as in Hennigian classification in biology (where the focus is similarly on "shared, derived characters" among related species; see 136:Ch.4), the assumption is that convergent evolution is relatively rare, and thus that exclusively shared innovations will appear only among the descendants of the parental language they first appeared in. This technique has been used intermittently since the time of Sapir (150; see review in 143) but perhaps nowhere more productively than in the major linguistic classifications of Greenberg (70, 71, 73) .
The second use of descent within historical linguistics works the other way around. In this instance, homologous aspects of descent-related languages are used to reconstruct basic features of the common ancestor or "protolanguage" of the group (163 hypothesis that linguistic evolution produces a characteristic series of sound changes through time within each language family (e.g. "Grimm's law" for Indo-European languages)-linguists have used sound correspondences among related languages to infer the historical pattern of sound shifts and thereby to reconstruct original words and expressions of the protolanguage. This procedure, too, has been widely applied, generating word lists and associ ated cultural inferences for many ancestral languages, including Proto-Atha paskan (55, 80) , Proto-Indo-European (e.g. 63; see also 107, [128] [129] [130] , Nostratic (85), Austronesian (12, 17, 18) , and Proto-Polynesian (124) (125) (126) , to name a few. In addition, comparative reconstruction has an important, more general role to play in the study of cultural evolution as described below.
BIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY Paradoxically, one of the early studies to put the principle of cultural descent to good use was Livingstone's (102) pioneering work in human genetics. In an attempt to test the "malaria hypothesis" for the distribution of the sickle cell gene (S) in West Africa, Livingstone found a striking correlation between the linguistic affiliation of local populations and frequencies of the S gene. The comparison allowed him to: attribute genetic differences between language groups to salient cultural differences, such as subsistence strategies, settlement patterns, and migration habits, but only be cause these properties were more or less consistent within language families. The success of the analysis, in other words, both in early tests and in later confirmations (see 53:Ch. 3), depended directly upon cultural similarities pro duced by descent.
Livingstone's analysis paved the way for other comparisons between the biological and linguistic phylogenies of human populations. Among other things, these studies add up to a striking confirmation of the validity of the procedures used to infer descent relationships in historical linguistics. One recent study by Greenberg et al (74) , for example, compared linguistic, dental, and genetic evidence among broad samples of indigenous New World popula tions, and found three closely matched subdivisions. The correspondence sug gested "that the Americas were settled by three separate population movements whose identity can be most precisely expressed in linguistic terms as Amerind, Na-Dene, and Aleut-Eskimo" (74:477). The finding raised no small controversy (see e.g. 43, 112), but subsequent genetic analysis (see 23, 31) has only strengthened the claim for the three-way split. Meanwhile, other researchers working on more or less analogous comparisons in Africa, Europe, and Oceania have confirmed the first study's most basic finding: "genetic differentiation clearly parallels the clustering of major linguistic families" (58: 151; also 79a, 88, 155). It takes little imagination to predict that the search for other correlated phylogenies will continue to shed new light on the genetic and cultural histories of regional populations.
Meanwhile, the descent principle has reached a kind of ultimate expression for both historical linguistics and biological anthropology in recent compari- (23, 31, 37, 39) . Using, on the one hand, genetic data (from both "classical" protein analysis and nuclear DNA polymorphisms) and, on the other hand, linguistic data [from Ruhlen's (142) impressive world scale compilation], these researchers find that the genetic family tree of human populations correlates "suprisingly well" with its (still somewhat incomplete) linguistic counterpart (3 1 :76) . This analysis, too, has drawn much criticism, some of it inevitable for a project of this scale (see e.g. 9, 120, 121, 173; see also replies in 38, 72) . But the fact remains that not even a rough and approxi mate correlation would be found were the descent relationship important only to the genes, and not the cultures, of human populations.
ARCHEOLOGY
The descent relationship has also played a visible role within archeology, although its analytical importance has often been overshadowed by unilinear stage models and "essentialist," typological thinking (47-49, 95, 152) .
Prominent archeological studies with a "phylogenetic theme" include works by Bellwood (II), Childe (96) . But surely the most comprehensive of such undertakings are recent works on (a) "the puzzle of Indo-European origins" by Renfrew and Mallory (e.g. 107, 128-131) and (b) "the evolution of the Polynesian chiefdoms" by Kirch (89-9 1) and Kirch & Green (92). In both cases the expanding archeological data base is supplemented by a wealth of independent information from historical linguistics (see sources above) and comparative ethnography. In the interest of brevity, and because the Indo-European case has been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere (see e.g. 107, 129), let me focus on the Polynesian work, which also draws upon the lessons of earlier phylogenetic studies by Goldman (64, 65 ; reviewed in 164) and Sahlins (145, 146 ; reviewed in 68). As Kirch has pointed out, Polynesia is almost an ideal setting for this kind of investigation:
The more than 40 ethnographically described societies "can be likened to a set of historical, cultural 'experiments', in which the founding ancestor was iden tical, but where certain variables--ecological, demographic, technologic, and so on-differed from case to case" (90:2-3; see also lla, 67, 162). tive archeological data and lexical reconstructions, Kirch (90:Ch. 3) is able to reconstruct significant features of "Ancestral Polynesian Society" (APS), and its internal variability, as these existed between about 500 Be and 300 AD. The characterization includes key aspects of technology, agriculture, animal hus bandry, marine exploitation, settlement pattern, kinship, and social relations. Among other things, the reconstruction shows that "Colonizing Polynesians in every case carried with them concepts of pyramidal social structure, of first fruits and tribute as obligatory to the chiefs, of chiefs as earthly representatives of ancestral dieties ... Land] of domination by the chiefs over labor and the means of production" (90:281). In all, it adds up to one of the more complete cultural reconstructions available, confirming by example the value of the descent principle for archeology.
From this common base, Kirch argues, the cultural/ideational systems of Polynesia differentiated and transformed, as did the interrelated systems of social relations (a distinction I would emphasize more than Kirch, for reasons outlined in 53), giving rise to the "myriad cultural and social variations" that characterized the region at the time of contact (90:2). By then, variations on the ancestral theme ranged from relatively egalitarian societies. most com monly on atolls, all the way to highly stratified polities. most commonly on high islands. "where the chiefly class claimed descent independent from com moners. ranked themselves internally into seven or eight grades. practiced sibling marriage to maintain those grades, mobilized corvee labor and organ ized production on a grand scale, and most notably, alienated land from own ership by commoners" (90:4) .
What forces guided the evolution of such differences? Here again Kirch draws upon the relationship of descent to infer a "synthetic explanation" with varied roles played by many factors (90:283; 92). The main argument can be summarized as follows: (a) Culturally sanctioned, politically motivated de mands by the chiefs for surplus production, plus (b) natural population in creases, operating within (c) the constraints of technology and varying local environments, propelled (d) various forms of expansion and intensification in agriculture and other production systems (90:281-82). Sooner or later (or not at all), depending on local conditions, expansion led to (e) competition and warfare between lineages, which if) increased the power and wealth of suc cessful chiefs, allowing them (g) to consolidate polities and restructure the social hierarchy, which in tum permitted them (h) to impose changes in local culture, including changes in the rules governing landholding, first-fruits cere monies, and the tribute they were owed, which then (i) fueled further demands for surplus, leading back to item a above and creating, under suitable circum stances, a positive feedback loop.
The processes are clearly delineated, the causal links plausible, and the overall model reasonably well supported by selected cases (especially Hawai'i; see 90:Ch. 10). Moreover, by basing the APS reconstruction largely upon independent linguistic data, Kirch & Green avoid the potential for circu-larity in their inferences (as would result, for example, if APS were recon structed by running the model backward, so to speak). There remain large gaps in the data, however, and many more cases beg to be tested (as in 91a), including atolls; in addition, much would be gained if the analysis were ex tended into the early post-contact period and explicitly linked up with studies of more recent Polynesian culture history (e.g. 147, 148; see also 164) . Never theless, the study is a benchmark in the annals of descent research. Indeed, it is almost a paradigm of the historical interplay between cultural evolution and social change. Here one sees particularly clearly how power differentials can, through the mechanism of imposition (see below), give particular direction to cultural change. But one also sees how directional change in culture translates back into further increases in the social asymmetry that allowed the imposition in the first place. The result-a reciprocally interactive "coevolution" of cul ture and social structure-is certainly not unique to Polynesia, but it does seem especially accessible there to further study. In the interest of brevity, let me offer examples of the use of the decent relationship in cultural anthropology according to the kind of inference that has been made, thus illustrating something of the greater potential for this kind of work. Descent has bcen used:
MODIFICATION
So given the premises (a) that existing cultural systems are all related by descent, but (b) that homologies are most apparent where divergence is rela tively recent, it becomes important to ask about transformation. What are the main processes that have guided the cumulative, sequential change of diverg ing cultures? Here the goals of EeT coincide nicely with recent efforts to "historicize anthropology" (e.g. 122, 123).
On Lhe subject of transformation, EeT proposes a general "selective reten tion" framework (after 28, 29) within which different authors or schools of thought argue for different versions. The basic idea is that transformation is caused by changes through time in the social distribution of alternative cultural forms or "variants" within a given population or subpopulation. The focus is on "who believes what" (or at least who seems to) and "why" within a given group of people, and on how the answers to these questions change through time. The problem is obviously complicated by social structure, and particu larly by differences in the social distribution of options, consequences, and power within a given population. To a considerable extent, social structure can be accommodated by identifying relatively homogeneous "reference groups" within the whole, and then by analyzing cultural dynamics within and between them (see also 53:210-1 1); however, this area of EeT deserves far more work and attention than it has thus far received.
Nevertheless, the basic idea of selective retention models is that the culture of a given reference group evolves as some variants gain in frequency among its members and others lose. EeT now hosts a whole range of propositions about how this happens. To date, the most promising involve "conveyance forces," that is, processes ("forces" in a metaphorical sense) causing differen tial rates of social transmission among the existing variants (see 52). More over, all such propositions assume that conveyance forces have a cumulative "recursive nature"; that is, the forces discussed below are viewed as acting repeatedly, over and over with the passage of time, such that trends (or stasis, as the case may be) emerge as a cumulati ve product of sequential, incremental change. Much in the way that individual frames relate to a movie, the forces at play in one "time step" relate to the eventual outcome of the cultural evolution ary process. In mathematical models of cultural change, this relationship is represented by so-called "recursion equations" or "recursion systems" (see e.g. 24, 35).
Transmission Forces
The first of three kinds of conveyance force can be called transmission forces. These arise from patterns of transmission-that is, from regularities in the social setting of the conveyance process. There are two central arguments here: One, from contextual studies, holds that the social organization and "style" of transmission have profound, cumulative effects on the aggregate properties of knowledge and culture; the second, from formal models, pro poses that regularities in the simple structure of transmission greatly influence the direction and rates of cultural change (or stasis).
Consider the formal models first, particularly those developed by Cavalli Sforza and Feldman (see especially 35). These investigators have identified 10 "major modes" of cultural transmission (e.g. from parent to child, among age peers, from teacher to pupil, from social leader to follower, etc), each with distinctive kinetic properties and different effects on the evolutionary persist ence of variants (34) . These 10 modes have been further distilled to four "major mechanisms" of cultural transmission: 1. one-to-one "vertical" trans mission (i.e. parent-to-child); 2. one-to-one transmission between nonrela tives, either "horizontal" (between two members of the same generation) or "oblique" (between a member of one generation and a nonrelated member of the next); 3. "one-to-many" transmission (one sender to many receivers), and 4. "many-to-one" transmission (or "concordant pressure" from many senders). The general evolutionary implications of each mode have been worked out using recursion mathematics. In the case of one-to-many transmission, for example, "cultural change is expected to be rapid and within-population vari ation loW"; in the case of many-to-one, on the other hand, transmission will be conservative and evolution slow, as fits intuitive expectations (36:20) .
These predictions have been tested in a number of quantitative assessments. One study examined "trait similarity" (e.g. religious and political affiliation, sports preferences, miscellaneous personal habits and beliefs) between stu dents at Stanford University, considered "recipients," and their parents and friends, considered "transmitters" (36) . The average correlation coefficients for vertical transmission (r ;;;; ; 0.22) were almost double those for horizontal transmission (r = 0.13) and were especially high for political and religious affiliation. Another study examined key contributors to the social transmission of subsistence, maintenance, and child-care skills among a sample of Aka pygmies of the Central African Republic (79). If anything, vertical transmis sion was even stronger in this context, with parents being significant teach ers/models for 80.7% of all skills examined. In contrast, one-to-many transmission "seems very rarely if ever found" among the Aka, suggesting that "the high similarity of pygmy cultural traits across a vast area in central Africa" is, in part, "a consequence of the prevalent transmission mechanisms" that tend to favor conservation of cultural forms (p. 933). In short, the models have solid heuristic value and generate testable, if not always surprising, predictions. Already drawing inspiration from epidemiology, the models could surely be improved by heeding Sperber's advice and striving more explicitly for "an epidemiology of representations ... rooted in cognitive psychology" (156:73; 157).
The second, more contextual argument about transmission forces comes from recent work by Barth. His argument, nicely summarized in a 1990 paper (8:640), is that "Differences between traditions of knowledge are illuminated by comparing the transactions in knowledge by which they are reproduced." For example, Barth compares the role of "the Conjurer" in Melanesian initia tion rites (especially those of the Mountain Ok of western Papua New Guinea)-in which the transmission of knowledge to initiates is actually less important than a brief, "spell-binding performance" of mysterious procedures and secret rites-with the role of the Guru of Southeast Asia (e.g. a Balinese Muslim teacher), where the pressures are not for secrecy and performance but for the clarity, elaboration, and duration of instruction. Barth argues that the differences in these modes of transmission "generate deep differences in the form, scale and distribution of knowledge ... with profound historic effects on their cultures, even where similar substantive ideas are embraced" (p. 640). The arguments are a logical, comparative extension of the theme of an earlier monograph (7), which showed how "processes of codification, transmission, and creativity in Ok cosmology generate the [impressive] pattern of variation" manifest among different Ok groups today. In both works, Barth takes his cue from Darwin (see 7:Ch. 4), attempting to identify a specific mechanism of cumulative, incremental change within the "informational economy" of com munities and regions. And in both cases, the argument provides a reasonably convincing account for observed variation, whether within or between tradi tions. Now it would be useful for the formal and contextual treatments of transmission to meet each other halfway and thus to generate models and simulations of the long-term, aggregate effects on culture of different "modes of managing knowledge" (8).
Natural Selection
The second of the three kinds of conveyance force is simply Darwinian natural selection acting on cultural variation, whether at the level of individuals, reference groups, or entire societies. In its most general form, natural selection may be said to occur whenever heritable variants, cultural or otherwise, differ in "fitness"-that is, whenever they differ in ways that affect the number of copies of each in the next generation. As Braun (25:79) puts it, "Natural selection for Darwin referred to the multiplicity of processes that together blindly shape the transmission of heritable characteristics in natural popula tions without artificial interference."
On this reading of Darwin, the natural selection of a variant refers to the preservation of that variant in a population by virtue of any replication advan tage it has over alternative variants. This meaning of natural selection has been championed by Boyd and Richerson in an important series of publications (24, 133-135). They argue that natural selection on cultural variation can produce both cultural adaptations (as judged by the standard biological criterion of reproductive success) and cultural maladaptations, depending upon whether cultural transmission is "symmetric" to that of the genes, and thus directed from parents to offspring, or "asymmetric," and thus includes input from persons other than parents. The synunetric case is straightforward and rela- tively intuitive. As Richerson & Boyd note (135), a pronatalist religion will spread through a population by natural selection at the expense of an "abstemi ous" one whenever parents both adhere to one creed or the other and success fully pass it on to their children. Another example might be natural selection for fava bean consumption in malaria prone regions (see 24: 178; 86, 87).
The asymmetric case is both more provocative and potentially more impor tant. As Boyd & Richerson note (24: 178), "Selection will act on asymmetri cally transmitted cultural variation if (1) there is competition to occupy the roles that are effective in such transmission and (2) individuals characterized by some cultural variants are more often winners in this competition than individuals characterized by other variants." This argument is applied, albeit in a preliminary way (24:200; also 133), "to explain the demographic transition ... . [People] like teachers and managers are disproportionately important in horizontal and oblique transmission in modernizing societies. In these circum stances, natural selection should act to increase the freqency of norms and values that stress the importance and value of these roles. Conflict with [repro ductive] fitness will occur if one's success ... in professional roles is nega tively correlated with family size. This is plausible since individuals with small families will have more time, money, and other resources to devote to the attainment of these social roles."
The argument is logical, consistent with findings from numerous demo graphic studies, and loaded with implications; clearly a detailed longitudinal study is warranted. The same logic has been applied to the evolution of unilineal kinship systems (see 132) where, again, careful empirical analysis is sorely needed; and to the evolution of celibate religious traditions where, "by avoiding the costs of bearing or supporting children, celibates could devote more time and resources to spreading their beliefs horizontally" (24:202). The latter case underscores the importance of empirical substantiation: Despite its plausibility, the argument runs up against fairly convincing alternative expla nations for at least a few of the world's major celibacy traditions (see 69:77-81 and 20 on Christian religious celibacy; 66:69-70 on celibacy in Tibet). These alternative explanations all entail another force-imposition-which brings us to the third and final category of conveyance force.
Cultural Selection
My own reading of Darwin convinces me that he normally used "natural selection" in the more specific sense of preservation by survival and reproduc tion advantage (i.e. preservation by actual biological propagation). To avoid confusion, I find it helpful (a) to think of Boyd & Richerson's "asymmetric" kind of selection as a transmission force (the first kind of conveyance force, discussed above), and thus (b) to distinguish it from both natural selection (kind 2) and a third kind, the differential social transmission of cultural vari ants as a function of human decision-making (see 53). Generally called "cul tural selection" (after 4, 35, 50, 53, 138, 139 , and others; called "biased Another useful pair of intergraded categories ranges from choice to imposi tion, or more precisely, from autonomous election (autonomous within the constraints of technology, world view , and actually existing variation) through to total compliance with the decisions of others. In instances of relatively unrestrained choice, the "carriers" of a given cultural variant are also its "selectors:" They decide whether to sustain one variant rather than another.
Where choice predominates, the variants kept alive, so to speak, in a given cultural system reflect the local, endogenous preferences of the carriers. Such or threatening to change the perceived consequences of options, or indeed by influencing the secondary values that will be used by the carr iers. Either way, the variants kept "alive" by imposition will reflect the endogenous preferences of the selectors, not those of the carriers. To be sure, imposition is a decision process; however, the social locus of decision-making in imposition is differ ent from that in choice, and implementation is here achieved through the exercise of power. Indeed, the very fact that power is generally required for effective imposition (see e.g. 105) suggests that the human "decision system" may well have been designed during its organic evolution to detect and resist such efforts. If so, then impositions are likely to be inherently unstable: Their persistence should then vary as a function of power asymmetries, the degree of imposed hardship, and awareness of potential options, among other things.
As noted elsewhere (52:199-200; 53:202) , these two pairs of intergraded categories----choice to imposition, and primary to secondary value selection can be viewed as the orthogonal axes of a Cartesian reference system for describing different forms of cultural selection. It should be emphasized that both axes represent continua rather than dichotomous categories, and thus that 
SELECTION BY CHOICE
A striking example of cultural selection by choice is offered in the recent analysis of "changing concepts of incest" among the Eastern Nuer by Hutchinson (81) . As a by-product of social and economic change, the eastern Nuer today are questioning the limits of rual (incest) in their traditional incest prohibition, using a method that Hutchinson terms "pragmatic 'fecundity testing'" (p. 637). Locally called "feuding," the method entails the elopement of a young couple whose relationship has been declared rual by local courts. "If the union then proves fruitful and the child thrives, the couple can later return to their families confident that some sort of marriage arrangement will be made. If not, the lovers usually separate voluntarily ... . It is the fortune or misfortune of such couples, closely watched and commented upon by all, that is later cited as evidence for or against the validity of a particular [incest] prohibition" (81 :630). The reason this process is so effective, continues Hutchinson, is that the Nuer believe that any union that bears healthy children is "divinely blessed" and is thus free of rual. In contrast, '''incest children' are expected to reveal their dangerous [divinely disapproved] origins through illness, abnormality, and early death" (p. 630). Hutchinson notes that because feuding reveals the limits of "divine tolerance" in this way it is "more powerful" than official court decrees in shaping local beliefs.
In this example, the Nuer conception of incest is evolving by choice. No external elite or political authority defines rual and imposes it upon the Nuer, and not even the local courts can effectively stem the tide of public opinion. Instead, the limits of rual are a matter of open discussion and autonomous election: Selected variants reflect the endogenous preferences of the carriers. (For a second, equally clear example, see 119:58-64.) An important exception in Nuerland tests the rule: the prohibition of incest between a man and his father's sister's daughter (FZD), which is considered worse than incest with his own daughter or sister (p. 625). Hutchinson shows that this one facet of the Eastern taboo reflects an enduring, internal power asymmetry between older men and their own sons (pp. 635-38). As befits imposition rather than choice, this facet is not subject to fecundity testing but is instead set aside, "insulated from the public rethinking and questioning of rual limits" (p. 639).
Note that the whole process, including both choice and imposition, also exemplifies secondary value selection. As a result of feuding, decisions among alternative definitions of incest are governed by an explicit value-that unions producing healthy children are divinely blessed-which itself requires social transmission. In addition, socially transmitted cultural notions of "shared blood," "shared cattle," and sacrifice (pp. 630-32) come into play; for exam ple, "the ritual splitting of an ox by a Nuer earth priest is believed effective in tempering, if not neutralizing, the misfortunes" of some forms of incest (p. 626). Secondary values are also crucial in the case of imposition. Says Hutchinson, Eastern Nuer share "the conviction that no sacrifice is powerful enough to counter the negative effects of FZD incest" (p. 637).
SELECTION BY IMPOSITION
A contrasting example of cultural selection by imposition is provided by Goody's analysis (69:Ch. 3) of historical change in the marriage prohibitions of Western Europe. Beginning with the "Letter of [Pope] Gregory" in the 6th century AD, which forbade the marriage of first cousins, the prohibition of marriage between close kin in Europe became a matter of "prime significance" for the Church and its missionaries (p. 56). In subsequent centuries, the Church extended the ban first to second cousins, then third cousins, and eventually, by the 11th century, to sixth cousins. Reports Goody, "Not only were these enormously extended prohibitions attached to blood or consanguineal ties, but they were assigned to affinal and spiritual kinship as well," including the levirate and sororate (p. 56). Morover, they were joined by new prohibitions against adoption, concubinage, and divorce, all of which were imposed by the Church. "Why," Goody then asks, "should the Christian Church institute a whole set of new [rules] in the sphere of kinship and marriage, when these ran contrary to the customs of the inhabitants they had come to convert, contrary to the Roman heritage upon which they drew, and contrary to the teaching of their Although no single study yet focuses precisely on these questions, prelimi nary answers are available from a reasonably "matched" pair of analyses, one by , which focuses on the effects of imposition, and one by myself (53:Ch. 6), which foc uses largely on choice. Consider the Thornhill study first, which uses data from 129 of the societies in the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SeeS) (1 17) to analyze variation not in "incest rules" per se but rather in rules of exogamy-that is, in "rules that regulate the mating and marriage of less closely related consanguineal kin and of affinal kin (kin by marriage)" (165: 15) . Several interrelated hypotheses are included in the full analysis (see 167) , one of which is particularly germane here : "that rules of mating and marriage are made in order to prevent families from concentrating wealth and/or power within lineages by intermarriage because such concentra tion may [threaten] the social status of leaders in society" (165:15) .
On the assumption (from 3) that "powerful men" generally make the rules of mating and marriage, Thornhill tests three specific predictions that follow from this hypothesis. She finds, first, that "in highly stratified societies the rules of mating and marriage [are] more extensive ... than in societies with little stratification" (165 : 15) . The association is particularly striking in the case of "maximally extensive" rules (Le. those applying to all patrilateral and matrilateral relatives), which are fo und only in societies with three or more hierarchical classes. Second, she finds that "highly stratified societies [have] harsher punishment for infraction of mating and marriage rules than societies with little stratification" (165:16), a finding consonant with Betzig's earlier analyis of despotism (14) . Finally, Thornhill also finds that "as stratification increases, rules [tend to be] less equitably applied" (165: 17), such that "rulers in stratified societies are rarely expected to observe the marriage rules and frequently marry their own relatives" (167:253).
Thornhill's analysis leaves little doubt that imposition has been a major force in the cultural evolution of marriage rules. By the same token, Thorn hill's definition of "mating and marriage rules"-which explicitly requires "the behavior ruled against [to have an effect] on the evolved interests of those who make the rules" (167:249)-builds in a certain guarantee of such results.
Moreover, this definition must surely explain why "only 44%" of the sample had nuclear family incest rules-a finding contrary to almost every published report since Murdock's (1 14)-and thus why it seems "that people (rulers in particular) are much more concerned about ... the mating and marriage of distant relatives and nonrelatives than they are about incest" (167:252).
My own, independent analysis (53:Ch. 6) uses the smaller "Sixty Cultures" world probability sample (see 94) to investigate variation in incest taboos per se-that is, variation in the breadth of prohibitions against sexual activity between kin. First, for each population in the sample, I define the breadth or extension of the taboo to refer to the most distant consanguineous relative, not including those covered by rules of exogamy, with whom ego is forbidden to have sexual relations (and therefore to marr y; for details, see 53:352-53, 511-15). By excluding the strictures of exogamy, this procedure effectively factors out much of the influence of imposition documented by Thornhill. Second, I then propose a model, based on Bateson' s "optimal outbreeding theory" (10) , for the cultural evolution by choice of incest taboos. The model predicts that the incest taboos of local populations will evolve toward exten sions that minimize the total average "costs" of inbreeding and outbreeding.
(Here "costs" include all adverse consequences-genetic, social, and psycho logical-of sexual relations with a given category of relative.) More specifi cally, the model predicts that incest taboos will be more extensive in the case of large communities that also promote geographical out-marriage, compared to small communities that also promote local in-marriage-a prediction di rectly opposite to that expected by the well-known Westermarck hypothesis (53:345-46) . My prediction is based on the argument that, other things being equal, the costs of outbreeding will tend to be higher in small, endogamous communities, and inbreeding costs may be lower there as well.
The test of these predictions against data from the "Sixty Cultures" sample produced a statistically significant association between the extension of incest prohibitions and the degree of community exogamy : generally speaking, a greater range of kin are prohibited as sex partners within exogamous commu nities, as compared with agamous and endogamous ones. Moreover, the asso ciation is stronger in the subset of societies (N = 30) with a small average community size (i.e. fewer than 400 members). In short, the test favors the optimal outbreeding theory and suggests that selection by choice has played an important, general role in the cultural evolution of existing incest taboos. On the other hand, the associations, though statistically significant, are not par- DURHAM ticularly strong (nonparametric Kendall's tau was 0.37 for the full sample and 0.48 for a subsample with small community size). And the study does not control for differences in social structure and hierarchy among the sample societies. It therefore seems likely that much of the unexplained variation reflects the evolutionary influence of imposition; further work on this topic is certainly called for.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have reviewed recent efforts to apply tools of evolutionary analysis to the study of cultural change. From studies of "descent" and studies of "modification" the following lessons, among others, can be drawn:
1. The hypothesis that existing cultural systems are all historically related in a branching hierarchical pattern of descent is worthy of more attention in anthropology and other social sciences than it has received to date. 
5.
The study of descent relations among human cultures would benefit from further empirical and theoretical work, particularly in regard to appropriate methodology and the perennial problem of disentangling diffusion from de scent.
6. New headway is also being made in the study of "transformation," or sequential change within a given cultural system, particularly in regard to major processes or "forces" of change. "Diversification," or the branching of one culture into two or more descendants, warrants much more attention than it now receives.
7.
Transmission forces, the natural selection of cultural variation, and vari ous forms of cultural selection have all yielded provocative results in specific individual studies. New applications of evolutionary culture theory, and new and better refinements of the theory, are bound to be insightful and productive. 
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